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I.

ARGUMENT

In this action the City of Moab (City) asserts four points of error with
respect to the decision of the trial court to reverse the City's denial of the
conditional use permit in question: a) the trial court incorrectly applied the socalled public clamor doctrine as it pertained to the administrative decision of the
City Council; b) the court erred by failing to affirm the decision where the City
found the application to be contrary to the mandatory terms of its comprehensive
plan; c) the court erred in failing to order a remand for clarifying findings; and d)
the court misapplied the standard of review by engaging in its own fact-finding.
This brief will focus on the public clamor doctrine and the current procedural
posture of the case. The City incorporates by reference the arguments previously
advanced as to all points of error, as set forth in its Opening Brief and Reply Brief,
and submits that reversal is warranted with respect to those arguments.

1.

PUBLIC CLAMOR AS A REASON FOR INVALIDATING A LAND
USE DECISION MUST BE PREDICATED UPON
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT, OR SERIOUS PROCEDURAL
MISCONDUCT.

The concept of public clamor as a basis for setting aside an adjudicatory land
use decision traces back to this Court's decision in Thurston v. Cache County, 626
P .2d 440 (Utah 1981 ). In that case this court rejected a public clamor argument
and held, inter alia, that a county government's reliance upon testimony from
1

neighboring landowners in the denial of a conditional use permit was proper where
the testimony was of an advisory nature. Id. at 445. The Court noted that though
the consent of neighboring property owners may not be a criterion for issuance or
denial of a land use permit, there is nothing wrong with reliance upon such
testimony through the public hearing process 1• Id. Implicit in that decision was
the concept that the local government must not cede its independence to those who
support or oppose a given application, and that public testimony may be
"advisory." Id.
Public clamor has subsequently been applied by lower courts to invalidate
local land use decisions where there was evidence of procedural misconduct by the
local government, or where public opposition was motivated by improper factors
outside the ambit of a zoning ordinance, such as a desire to exclude the mentally
ill. Reply Brief, pp. 11-13; citing: Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704
(Utah App. 1988); Uintah Mountain RTC, LLC v. Duchesne County, 127 P.3d
1270 (Utah App. 2005). Both decisions relied in part on this Court's ruling in
Thurston County, and both were in general agreement with the United States

1

Similarly, this Court has recognized that a local government may properly rely
upon all manner of public testimony when it acts in a legislative context, such as a
rezoning decision. Gay/and v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633, 635-636 (Utah
1961).
2

Supreme Court decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.

432 (1985).
The instant case presents none of the invalidating causes for government
action, such as procedural irregularities, or discriminatory motives, as found in

Davis County or Uintah Mountain RTC. Nevertheless, the trial court erred by
conflating public opposition focused on the approval criteria of the land use code
with improper clamor. This illustrates that lower courts need clearer guidance as
to when public testimony in a land use case crosses the line into improper clamor.
In the absence of clarification there is a genuine risk that the doctrine of clamor
will undermine constitutionally protected speech by those who seek to challenge
land use applications.

a.

Clarification of the Thurston County Rule is Appropriate.

Although this court abides by its precedent, stare decisis is neither
mechanical nor rigid as it relates to courts of last resort. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d
393, 399 (Utah 1994). And, precedent may be modified where it is unpersuasive,
not firmly rooted, or likely to become inconsistent with other principles of law.

Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553, if22, ,J40 (Utah 2015). Indeed, where a rule
of law has a chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech, or is otherwise in
tension with First Amendment principles, that is a reason to abandon the precedent.
Id. at ,r 53, 54.
3

b.

Lower Courts Misapply Thurston County in a Manner that
Infringes Upon First Amendment Freedoms.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
citizens have the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and this
right to petition extends to efforts to influence the result of a local government land
use decision. Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, ~ 26-28 (Utah
2005 ); Reply Brief pp. 10-11. Despite the constitutionally rooted nature of public
testimony in land use proceedings, there is at least some authority which
misapplies the public clamor concept to exclude or minimize the effect of public
testimony.
In this case the Appellee property owners (Owners) place a great reliance
upon the Utah Court of Appeals opinion in Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction, Inc.
v. West Jordan City, 999 P .2d 1240 (Utah App. 2000), which they cite for the
proposition that a decision to deny a conditional use permit may not be based
solely on adverse public comment. Id. at~ 17; Appellees' Response Brief, pp. 44452. This conclusion is erroneous, as this Court in Thurston County held that it is
appropriate that a local government hear and rely upon just such testimony.
Thurston County, 626 P.2d at 445. Nonetheless, the argument shows that lower

2 Wadsworth Construction contains questionable reasoning and, in any event, is not
binding upon this Court.
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courts are applying the concept of public clamor in a manner that infringes upon
the constitutionally mandated right to petition.
The dispute shows that the boundaries of the public clamor doctrine must be
clearly defined so that fundamental First Amendment freedoms to speak and, more
importantly, to have one's concerns acted upon, are not displaced by a de facto
exclusionary rule as to public testimony. In fact, the Owners in this case urge just
such a rule of exclusion as to public testimony. See Response Brief, p. 45.
A local government must be able to consider and give consideration to all
credible testimony in an adjudicatory proceeding, and it may rely upon public
testimony in reaching its decision unless there is a basis for invalidating that action
under the doctrine of clamor. Any other conclusion would tum land use
adjudicatory proceedings into an empty gesture, where the concerns of affected
persons are heard and summarily ignored.
c.

Improper Motive is Established by Bias or Reliance Upon Factors
which are Not Founded in the Land Use Code.

An appropriate formulation of the public clamor doctrine requires that a
court reviewing an adjudicatory decision of a land use authority may only find that
the decision is the product of improper public clamor where: a) the decision is
motivated by prejudice or improper motive; or b) the land use authority engages in
serious procedural misconduct which confirms the presence of bias, or which

5

comprises the fairness of the proceeding3 • The two elements are discussed
separately.
1.

Bias or Improper Purpose May Constitute Clamor.

Zoning and planning authority is vested in local governments for the
purpose of promoting public health, safety, prosperity, morals, peace, general
welfare, and good order. U.C.A. § 10-9a-102; see also, Marshall v. Salt Lake City,
141 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1943). But, where a local government engages in land
use decision making which is attenuated from its legitimate purposes, such that it
gives effect to bias or irrational fears directed at a disfavored group, then it acts
irrationally and an adjudicatory land use decision will be struck down. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). Thus, while local
governments can address concerns of public safety or welfare, they cannot give
effect to public distaste or prejudice. Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308,
..

311 (4th Cir. l 989)(invalidating denial of conditional use permit for operation of
palmistry shop where decision was motivated by irrational public and religious
concerns); accord Davis v. Clearfield City, 756 P. 2d at 712 (noting near uniform
public opposition when a mental health facility or jail is proposed, and identifying

3

As stated, this formulation of public clamor is entirely consistent with the
statutory standard of review, which requires that an adjudicatory decision be
supported by substantial evidence and not be arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
U.C.A. § 10-9a-801(3)(c).
6

the decision as pretext for that opposition). Land use decisions founded on bias or
prejudice against a disfavored group may amount to improper clamor.
Conversely, where a local government acts on the basis of legitimate zoning
concerns such as noise, access, parking, traffic, or the suitability of a proposed use
for a given neighborhood, the action is proper, even if a source of evidence is
testimony from interested members of the public. E.g. Thurston v. Cache County,
626 P .2d at 444-445.
ii.

Serious Procedural Misconduct May Evidence Clamor.

At its core, improper clamor as a basis for setting aside a land use decision
rests on the notion that a local government acted pursuant to a pretext to give effect
to private bias. Markers for this kind of conduct may include procedural
irregularities. Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals found public clamor where there
was evidence of secret closed-door meetings by the land use authority in which the
application was considered. Davis v. Clearfield County, 756 P.2d at 711-712;
Reply Brief, pp. 11-14. Likewise, in that case the court noted that the planning
commission yielded to public sentiment by asking for a show of hands of persons
at a hearing to measure support or opposition to the application. Id. at F .N. 9.
Again, those facts suggest that public officials have ceded their official duties to
the public, rather than acting independently on the basis of their own judgment.

7

The rule to be gleaned from these authorities is that when public opposition
to a land use matter is accompanied by significant procedural irregularities, it is
proper for a court to infer that the decision was the product of public clamor.
d.

The City Acted Properly to Weigh the Testimony Against the
Criteria in the Ordinance.

In the review of an adjudicatory proceeding this Court owes no deference to
the trial court decision, which is not accorded any presumption of correctness.
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P. 3d 1208,

~

17 (Utah 2004 ). Under the correct

formulation of the public clamor doctrine the decision by the Moab City Council
easily stands up to review. See Reply Brief, pp. 14-16.
There is no evidence in this case that the City acted on the basis of a
discriminatory motive, nor were there any procedural irregularities in the review
process that would suggest bias or improper clamor. The record discloses staff
level review, followed by hearings before the Planning Commission and City
Council. The Owners reviewed a number of comments from the public and
submitted their own written rebuttal prior to the final decision. R. 0320-0321.
There was genuine debate on the City Council followed by a 3-1 vote against the
application. R. 0371-380; R.0408-0411. Prior to the vote, one Council member
noted that the application did not comply with the mandatory provisions of the
City's General Plan, a fact which would justify denial even in the absence of any
public testimony. R. 0380-0381; Reply Brief, p 6. This record hardly suggests a
8

wholesale capitulation of a local government to the unreasoned sentiments of the
public.
Moreover, review of the application was based on the substantive criteria in
the Moab ordinances, which are strict when it comes to the expansion of business
activities in residential neighborhoods. Public testimony focused on the criteria in
the conditional use ordinance, and pointed out likely noise, traffic, and crowding
impacts, as well as the concern that the proposed use was not compatible with the
neighborhood4 • Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, pp. 3-10. Some of this
testimony was quite specific, noting, for example, the projected increase in traffic
and evidence that noise emissions from off highway vehicles coming and going
from the site would likely exceed City noise ordinance levels. See Reply Brief, pp.
15-165 . Despite having the burden of proof, the Owners did little to rebut these
statements; nor did they suggest conditions that would mitigate the likely impacts
of the project. R.0320-0321 (Owners rebuttal statement). The evidence was
sufficient to convince the City Council that the use was not compatible with the
site.

4

Compatibility of a proposed use with existing uses in a neighborhood is a valid
approval condition, and does not amount to a "neighborhood veto" as to a land use
approval. See Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 290 (Utah App. 1994);
citing: Thurston v. Cache County.
5

In the interest of space, the City will not repeat that testimony here.
9

II. CONCLUSION
This case reflects a careful, if imperfect, attempt by the City of Moab to
evaluate a land use application based on the evidence in the record. There was no
conduct to suggest that the City abandoned its role as independent decision maker
or buckled to the unreasoned prejudice of a mob. This case does not present a
decision based on pretext to conceal an improper motive or discriminatory
purpose. Rather, this case illustrates that this Court must affirm that the public has
an important role in adjudicatory land use proceedings, and that public testimony
focused on zoning criteria cannot be dismissed as improper or "mere clamor."
The decision of the trial court must therefore be reversed.

III.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

The City of Moab hereby requests oral argument in this appeal.

Submitted this 7th day of February, 2017.
DUFFORD, WALDECK, MILBURN
&KR HN, LLP
By: l ~ : . . J l & : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6 A ~ ~ ~ ~ Chnstopher . McAnany, #7933
Attorneys for Appellants
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